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ABSTRACT
The European Digital Fortress and Large Biometric EU IT Systems: Border Crimi-
nology, Technology, and Human Rights
Today, at a time when we are witnessing the “multiplication of borders”, borders are 
occupying new domains. The article focuses on the erection of digital borders by 
means of biometric technology, which is creating new knowledge through the com-
pilation of large biometric databases in the EU. By “tattooing” borders onto immi-
grant bodies, disciplinary power is being superseded by the post-disciplinary power 
of “instant surveillance”. The article continues by analysing re-bordering practices by 
means of seemingly apolitical information technology, and concludes by delving into 
the new harms caused by re-bordering, including violations of human rights and the 
emergence of multi-layered criminal law.
KEY WORDS: biometric data, human rights, information technology, border criminology, 
large IT database
IZVLEČEK
Evropska digitalna trdnjava in veliki biometrični EU IT sistemi: Kriminologija meje, 
tehnologija in človekove pravice
Danes, ko smo priča »multiplikaciji meja«, meje zasedajo nova področja. Članek se 
osredotoča na digitalne meje, ki v EU vznikajo z uporabo biometrične tehnologije, kar 
z oblikovanjem velikih biometričnih podatkovnih zbirk ustvarja novo vednost. Avtor 
v članku pokaže, kako s »tetoviranjem meja« na imigrantska telesa disciplinsko oblast 
nadomešča »hipna oblast«, nato pa odstre dileme, povezane s premikanjem meja, kar 
omogoča domnevno apolitična informacijska tehnologija. V zadnjem delu predstavi 
nove oblike škode, vključno s kršitvami človekovih pravic, in nastajajoče večplastno 
kazensko pravo, ukrojeno glede na »hierarhije državljanstva«.
KLJUČNE BESEDE: biometrični podatki, človekove pravice, informacijska tehnologija, 
kriminologija meje, velika podatkovna zbirka
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INTRODUCTION
European criminologists have been concerned with migration policies since the late 
1980s and have described how criminal law measures have merged with the adminis-
tration of migration. This interest in the convergence of migration and criminal justice 
has been termed the “criminology of mobility” (Franko Aas, Bosworth 2013) or “bor-
der criminologies” (Bosworth, Turnbull 2014) and analysed as the emergence of “crim-
migration law”, i.e. the convergence of criminal law and procedure and migration law 
and procedure (Hernández 2017). In this process of convergence of the two fields, 
cutting-edge information technology plays a significant role. Migration policy does 
not consist solely of laws, but also of high-tech “solutions”, which are changing the 
borders of Europe into an “e-Border” (Dijstelbloem, Meijer, Besters 2011) and an “elec-
tronic fortress” (Unmüßig, Keller 2012). Biometric technology in particular has become 
“the prime technology for tracing the new globality in both its abject and privileged 
forms” (Franko Aas 2011). The fascination with such technologies in regulating migra-
tion grew exponentially in the aftermath of 9/11, following the USA’s power to export 
its security agenda and impose biometric passports on the rest of the world (Franko 
Aas, Bosworth 2013: 31). Biometry is now used as a way of “tattooing” borders onto 
migrant bodies. Despite its inefficiencies, e.g. false positives and separate treatment 
of migrants by producing ‘disqualified bodies’ (Adey 2004), biometric technology is 
spreading and may even employ innovations such as facial expression recognition 
(Boffey 2018) and language accent detection (Lin 2018) in the near future.
Biometric technologies must be regarded as an immanent part of other politi-
cal processes. In analysing Frontex, for instance, Wilson showed how the vast tech-
nocratic and informational infrastructures reinforce the existing political agendas: 
“[r]isk analysis endeavours to anticipate and pre-empt border futures through cal-
culation and projection […]. Such imagined futures are then drawn back into the 
present through the conception of the ‘near real-time’ border” (Wilson 2018: 46). The 
employment of these technologies is fostering existing trends such as “securitisa-
tion” – the perception that ascertaining the correct identity of an individual, and in 
particular a foreigner, is accepted as a security issue. At the same time, border tech-
nologies are a product of the existing perception that migration must be “managed” 
and responded to with technology. “Technology, however, is not just the ‘means’ that 
allows political and administrative aims to be carried out; technology creates its own 
possibilities and limitations, which implies that any targets that are thus achieved are 
always ‘mediated’” (Dijstelbloem et al. 2011). The engagement of the vast IT apparatus 
for migrant purposes in the EU serves to centralise the power of the EU institutions 
and paves the way towards the Schengen area, which is regarded as “one of the major 
achievements of integration” (European Commission 2016: 2). EUROSUR, the Europe-
an external border surveillance system, for instance, has been a catalyst for new so-
cial relations among disparate sectors, creating areas for collaboration and competi-
tion, compliance and conflict (Andersson 2016). It is not so much a tool for detection 
53
4 9  •  2 0 1 9 The European Digital Fortress and Large Biometric EU IT Systems: Border Criminology, Technology, and Human Rights
at the borders and beyond, but rather for how border policing is socially organised 
(ibid.: 35). Moreover, Frontex is also tasked with contributing to technological devel-
opment (Wilson 2018). It is mandated with purchasing technical equipment on its 
own behalf (Lemberg Pedersen 2013). By interlinking business entities with the polit-
ical migration agendas, Frontex thus operates as a chamber of commerce despite its 
attractive rhetoric of “saving the lives of migrants”.
Arendt (2013: 7–8) claims that violence needs tools. The technological revolution 
has thus always been most notable in the military domain, and the contemporary 
“militarisation of the border” employs IT on a large scale. Military logic thus under-
pins the IT tools employed in border control, such as carbon dioxide sensors at border 
checks, infrared sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the large biometric databas-
es compiling data on retina scans, fingerprints, and DNA. As these tools are of mili-
tary origin, their deployment in the management of migration reframes migration 
in security terms. These tools dictate a specific framing of the social challenges, and 
military tools are in addition attuned to the binary logic of “us” and “them”, of exclu-
sion and inclusion, and of the extermination of the “other”. From such a perspective, 
unwanted migration is not a product of “Western” European policies and failures in 
tackling the roots of the problem, such as the rising tide of global inequalities, but a 
security management issue which must be addressed with technology. The specific 
“political and technological framing places migrants as a source of insecurity (and as 
potential criminals), rather than people who are exposed to considerable dangers 
on their migratory journeys, and therefore deserving of protection and assistance” 
(Pickering et al. 2014).
This article focuses on the following two questions: How do the new technolo-
gies of mobility control, especially biometric technologies, intensify surveillance by 
redefining borders? And: What are the dangers and human rights implications of the 
data-driven IT tools employed for the surveillance of the EU borderlands?
In the second section, the article documents the existing research on the crim-
inalisation of mobility and shows how this is reshaping criminal justice institutions, 
prisons, and policing, or, more broadly, how mobility is bringing new challenges 
to understanding criminalisation, crime, and punishment (Franko Aas 2013). In the 
third section, the article tackles the meaning of what a border actually is. What does 
the notion of “multiplication of borders” (Balibar 2015; Bendixsen 2017) mean and 
how do borders move and occupy new terrain and domains, including the digital 
domain? Here, the article starts from the insight that the EU’s borders are in con-
stant flux due to its inability to effectively address the reasons for migration. They 
are theorised as being neither solid nor liquid, but “gaseous” (Bigo 2014), or, in the 
context of the 2015 “migrant crisis” in the Balkans, even as “cloudy” (i.e. cloud-based) 
(Milivojević 2018). Amongst the many technologies of mobility already installed for 
EU border “security”, this article then focuses on biometric technology. It shows how 
the large EU IT systems in the areas of borders, visas, and asylum, and digitisation 
megaprojects such as EUROSUR and the Smart Borders Package in the EU, are all 
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part of the rising transnational governance of the European borderlands. With the 
electronic upgrading of border controls – externally through EUROSUR and internal-
ly through the Smart Borders Package complementing SIS II,1 EURODAC,2 and VIS3 
– the EU has been creating one of the world’s largest biometric databases. Through 
the interoperability efforts, i.e. the legislative proposals on interoperability between 
EU information technology systems presented in December 2017, and the constant 
monitoring of European borderlands with EUROSUR, i.e. a “system of all systems”, 
Europe is re-defining the concept of border and is designing a post-panoptical type 
of “instant surveillance”. 
New technologies provide a constant gaze that obviates the need to discipline 
crimmigrant bodies. Biometric technology inscribes the border in the body as a form 
of “political tattoo” that obviates the necessity for disciplinary surveillance. The large 
biometric EU IT systems play both a reactive and productive role in surveillance – to-
wards a post-panoptical type of “instant surveillance”. Because the new IT tools have 
profound implications for human rights, the fourth section then maps the harms 
caused by digital borders and discusses several implications of digital borders for 
human rights. The article then focuses on the functioning of large EU IT systems in 
the areas of borders, visas and asylum in Slovenia. It points out several human rights 
concerns and paints a broader picture of harms that the personal data protection law 
cannot sufficiently address. The article concludes with some views on the relation-
ship between the cutting-edge technologies and the specific social-cultural milieux: 
these technologies are placed into specific socio-cultural situations and in turn deep-
en migration control practices in a militarised, securitised and externalised manner.
THE EXISTING RESEARCH ON CRIMMIGRATION
Features of Crimmigration
Current criminological scholarship has identified several features of crimmigration. 
The increasing interlinking of policy areas such as travel and border management 
with counter-terrorism, smuggling, and human trafficking has mixed the regulato-
ry boundaries both institutionally and functionally. The blurring of boundaries be-
tween the police and border patrol, i.e. the tendency for the police to assume bor-
der patrol duties and for the border control to become more police-like, has been 
observed in several countries (e.g. in Canada in Stumf 2013). Similarly, in the EU the 
military regularly provides equipment and personnel to patrol the Mediterranean. 
The hybridisation of prisons and detention centres (Bosworth 2013) has made them 
1  SIS II – The second-generation Schengen Information System.
2  EURODAC – European Dactyloscopy System.
3  VIS – The Visa Information System.
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indistinct as places depriving individuals of free movement, but with the important 
difference that migration centres often lack any rehabilitation programmes. The 
measure of confinement (besides deportation) has become identified as the pre-
dominant tool of “bordered” penality. Penal systems with a “double-vision” (one for 
citizens and one for migrants) or a multi-layered system based on “hierarchies of cit-
izenship” (Franko Aas 2013), in accordance with which resources are distributed, now 
enables the tailored distribution of welfare benefits. The EU Smart Borders Package, 
which includes the Entry/Exit System (EES), is a clear example of “double penality”. 
The system will be interconnected with the Visa Information System (VIS) database 
and will supposedly only allow law enforcement authorities to access the database 
for criminal identification and intelligence in order to prevent serious crime and ter-
rorism. However, it exclusively targets non-EU nationals with significant data collec-
tion (see critique in Roson 2018).
Border control is increasingly associated with the language and hardware of 
warfare. For instance, Frontex’s pre-packaged rhetoric is full of military jargon and 
adjectives that emphasise the illegitimate, threatening and thus ‘criminal’ charac-
ter of irregular migration (Campesi 2014). Similarly, EUROSUR can utilise unmanned 
air vehicles, which resonates “uncomfortably with the US government’s use of un-
manned ‘drones’ in the Afghanistan conflict” (Singh Bhui 2013). The so-called “sit-
uational awareness” of EUROSUR has its origins in aerial combat dating back to the 
First World War (Wilson 2018). The language of business enterprises coexists with the 
deployment of military jargon, with the external border described as the “operation-
al theatre” (Andersson 2014: 76).
Strengthening Criminalisation and Changing Penality
Criminologists have so far tackled the following two broad questions related to mi-
gration: What are the novel types of crime/perceived dangers? And: How do agen-
cies, e.g. the police, public prosecutors, courts, etc. change their response when 
crimes are committed by individuals without formal membership?
The first question concerns the strengthening of states’ ability to deport, appre-
hend and detain migrants and to extend the state’s punitive practices to the realm 
of border control. This in itself is a disruption of the traditional distinction between 
criminal and migration law. Another aspect of this question relates to extending 
power in the border domain in a different, often harsher, manner (e.g. for the evolu-
tion of a two-sided penal culture see Barker 2013; Lacey 2008; Ugelvik 2013). Some 
even suggest that this is in fact a multi-layered penal culture (Franko Aas 2013).
Strengthening criminalisation includes changes in both substantive and proce-
dural criminal law. In terms of the substantive part, scholars’ concerns have focused 
on the establishment of offences for human smuggling, as well as for irregular entry, 
transit, and stays (Mitsilegas 2017). As regards procedural law, several innovations 
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are undermining the due process of law, denying migrants the effective assistance 
of counsel, privacy rights, and the rights to asylum and protection (Greene, Carson, 
Black 2016; Kogovšek Šalamon 2017).
The second question relates to changes in penality. Scholars have shown how 
the goals of penal intervention have changed from the reintegration of offend-
ers into society towards deportation; called also “bordered penality” (Franko Aas 
2014). However, the role of technologies in redefining the border has not attracted 
much-needed attention in criminological studies.
WHAT AND WHERE IS THE BORDER?
There are now more physical barriers at European borders than at any time during 
the Cold War (Bremmer 2018). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, more than forty coun-
tries around the world have built fences against more than sixty of their neighbours 
(The Economist 2016). These physical borders are leaving countries such as Turkey 
and Greece to house large numbers of migrants. As these bottleneck countries can-
not absorb them all, wealthier countries are investing heavily in new technologies.
What is the Digital Border?
The conventional thinking according to which borders are understood as territorial 
demarcations that separate (and thus constitute) sovereign nation states has been 
broadly criticised (Bigo 2014; Balibar 2015). Borders should be understood as phys-
ical devices as well as structures of the imagination – giving a sense of belonging. 
In the latter sense, the notion of an “inner border” (innere Grenze as per Fichte, in 
Pajnik 2017: 236) encapsulates the insight that we all perpetuate borders between 
“us” and “them” as we live in “imagined communities” (Anderson 1998). For crimi-
nologists, the differential treatment in prisons between citizens and foreigners ulti-
mately serves as a constant re-enactment of the border and a reminder that they do 
not belong (Franko Aas, Bosworth 2013). But what about the digital border? What is 
a digital border and how does it function?
At a meeting coordinated by Frontex, along with eu-LISA4 and the European Asy-
lum Support Office (EASO) on the island of Lesbos in 2016, EU officials asked tech 
companies to pitch ways to track and control people trying to reach the continent 
before they get here, and several tech companies showcased their latest ideas (Tay-
lor, Graham Harrison 2016). Unisys, for instance, had devised a “refugee management 
suite” for enabling the pre-registration of asylum seekers. Its proposals included 
4 eu-LISA – The European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in 
the area of freedom, security and justice.
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controlling refugees before they reach Europe using phone apps and biometric data 
gathering; tracking people once they are inside Europe using new identity cards; 
a system of red flags; and data analytics to highlight those with backgrounds that 
merit investigation. This “refugee management suite” merely offers a new form of 
surveillance. “The use of behaviour analytics which treat past conduct as currency 
for food and shelter marks a new descent into the moral abyss,” claimed civil liber-
ty groups (ibid.). The vignette shows that with digital surveillance, borders can be 
“everywhere”. They have changed as a concept as they are digitised and inscribed 
in the body.
The multiplication of borders in digital realms shows how the notion of the 
border is in constant flux. The new borders are not “liquid” or “solid” but “gaseous”, 
claims Bigo (2014). Milivojević (2018) suggests that we should speak of “cloud-based” 
borders: borders are “deployed and defended in the digital sphere”. But what and 
where is the border when large EU IT systems, such as SIS II, VIS, and EURODAC, are 
employed in border control? Large biometric IT systems clearly draw new borders 
following from novel demarcations. Here it is necessary to turn to Balibar’s (2015) 
insight into the multiplication of borders in Europe. He observes how the perception 
of being “truly” a European country changes over time and space. Some European 
countries are tentatively perceived by others as not being fully European, or as mere-
ly belonging to “buffer zones”, and this ascription is relative rather than absolute. 
Such labelling follows a north-south “gradient” in the sense that the controller of a 
state’s border is its southernmost (or rather south-easternmost) neighbour (Balibar 
2015). The “external borders” of Europe, he concludes, actually cut right through it 
and fragment Europe into several superimposed slices.
His argument has to be extended in order to encapsulate digital borders, due 
to the fact that another type of multiplication is taking place. By relying on the new 
knowledge created by the large databases, the EU countries are inscribing borders 
in the body – the “body becomes a password or passport” (Franko Aas 2011). By 
employing biometric technology and stockpiling biometric data for “real-time” (or 
“near real-time”) background checks, borders are directly inscribed, or “tattooed”, in 
the body. The border is inscribed into individuals’ retinas, voices, or DNA. The new 
border is mobile and migrates with the unwanted body. “Border checks are chang-
ing their location” (Dijstelbloem et al. 2011) as the border has become portable (ID 
cards) and virtual (databases) (Lyon 2005).
This new feature of connecting identity and citizenship with the body offers the 
allure of objectivity and infallibility. The body becomes an unambiguous token of 
truth (Franko Aas 2006). As Franko Aas (2011) puts it, “the body does not lie” – docu-
ments can be counterfeited and lost, while fingerprints, DNA, iris scans, etc., cannot 
be forged by the extensive illicit migration industry. It can no longer be avoided or 
escaped. By means of large biometric databases, the EU is imposing its own regimes 
of truth. The need for trust vanishes in the materiality of the body – and biometric 
technology fills the void. By establishing biometric databases regarding third country 
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nationals, the EU does not have to rely on documents issued by third countries to 
their own populations, thus enabling it to decide who deserves and who does not 
deserve to cross its borders and remain on its soil.
This new type of surveillance is in essence post-disciplinary. One way of theoris-
ing this shift was offered by Bigo, who claims the new surveillance is “ban-optic”. Its 
goal is “banning” and expelling people instead of integrating them into the EU (Bigo 
2006). While this explains one part of the change, it is not clear how the compliance 
of docile bodies is achieved. It is not achieved through the “training of the soul” or 
self-discipline, but instead by power directed into the body through sensors, based 
on biometric data. The new type of post-panopticon does not need a presumed 
watcher in the tower (cf. Andrejevic 2016; Bučar Ručman 2016) as the gaze becomes 
ever-present. Docile bodies may literally be constantly tracked. The migrant subjec-
tivity no longer needs to be disciplined and is no longer at the centre stage of sur-
veillance – in the exercise of power, the body replaces the soul and becomes the 
focal point of the post-disciplinary “constant surveillance”.
Migrant bodies with the right “tattooing” may move freely, while others cannot. 
Technology ascribes risk based on big data analytics directly in the body. Some bod-
ies are perceived as being riskier than others simply due to algorithmically inferred 
high-risk scores. In practice this means that IT tools are changing the regime govern-
ing the flow of people. Bodies with the right “political tattoo” can enter the EU and 
be granted fundamental rights according to refugee and asylum law, while others 
are left in the borderlands. At one extreme, as Balibar (2015) graphically demon-
strates, are those who “practically ‘live’ in planes, airports, shopping centres, confer-
ence halls,” while at the other end of the mobility spectrum are groups “who travel 
by foot or on trucks on the roads of exile, carrying a child in their arms and a back-
pack on their shoulders – the only things that they still own.” When the algorithms 
recognise someone as a security risk, in-depth security checks are triggered; the cal-
culations are made based on a variety of techniques using big data and algorithmic 
inference of risk, based e.g. on voice analysis (Boffey 2018) or travel patterns (Kahn 
2014). While resistance to earlier types of biometric technologies such as fingerprints 
led migrants to burning or disfiguring their fingertips (Franko Aas 2011) in order to 
disable the “tattooing” of borders, more advanced technologies such as voice anal-
ysis (“voiceprint”) attach legal regimes directly to the bodies, rendering resistance 
futile. These are the new “violent borders” (Jones 2017), which span and multiply not 
only over geographical areas. They are compressed into digital language and thus 
also span over the digital space.
Instruments of Digital Bordering
Reliance on the “political tattooing” of unwanted bodies evolved in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring in late 2010 in Tunisia, when the heads of the EU Member States 
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adopted the conclusions of the EU Council resulting in new border policies “protect-
ing” the Union against immigration (Unmüßig, Keller 2012). Basically, the decision 
was made to reinforce the external borders using state-of-the-art surveillance tech-
nology, “thus turning the EU into an electronic fortress” (ibid.).
In their critical review of the earlier proposal of the European Commission’s 
Smart Borders Package, i.e. the Entry/Exit System (EES) and Registered Traveller Pro-
gramme (RTP), Guild et al. (2008) claimed that the enhanced use of new technologies 
in European security policies is merely a “step closer to a ‘cyber-fortress Europe’”. 
The travelling public will find itself increasingly the object of state suspicion, with 
no concrete reason or grounds (ibid.). Disproportionate measures will very likely be 
ineffective e.g. in facilitating the entry of bona fide travellers, and the large databas-
es will breach data protection laws. Back than several layers of security were already 
in place for checking third-country nationals, and additional databases were not a 
necessary means to combat illegal stays. A decade later all of the proposed systems 
are operational, i.e. the SIS II, VIS, and EURODAC databases are fully operative and 
have even been expanded to include more types of data (SIS II). The Smart Borders 
Package was signed on 30 November 2017, and the EES is scheduled to become fully 
operative by 2020. Moreover, new agencies have been established, such as eu-LISA, 
the EU Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems, which is 
mandated to manage and further develop large IT systems. Multi-layered technical 
development, such as the EUROSUR multi-layered surveillance, is being reinforced 
(Hayes, Vermeulen 2012: 23). The further digitisation of border surveillance is expect-
ed with the proposed European Travel Information and Authorisation System, i.e. 
ETIAS, a visa waiver system planned to be operative in 2021. Automatic application 
processing envisages checks against SIS II, VIS, EUROPOL, Interpol (SLTD5 & TDAWN6), 
and EURODAC data. All of the data will be cross-checked against these databases to 
determine if a person is a security risk. Moreover, the formerly separate VIS, SIS II, and 
EURODAC databases will be integrated and interlinked. Reliance on the knowledge 
created by large biometric databases puts digital borderlands at the centre stage of 
human rights concerns.
5  SLTD – Stolen and Lost Travel Documents.
6  TDAWN – Travel Documents Associated with Notices.
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THE HARMS CAUSED BY DIGITAL BORDERS
The Human Rights Implications of Digital Borders
The new digital borders, erected alongside the physical fences, may have the same 
devastating effects as razor-wire fences – their immateriality hides their effect. Fenc-
es are purportedly intended to scare off migrants, rather than to actually prevent 
them from crossing. In terms of physical strength, fences are weak and cannot be 
placed along the entire border between states. An army would be needed to guard 
them, as migrants can destroy, fly over, or dig under such fences. In contrast, migrant 
management tools, e.g. databases, algorithmic decision-making tools, risk assess-
ment instruments, and predictive analytics to screen migrants, are building impene-
trable mobile digital walls. These borders are indiscriminately forced upon migrants. 
Like all “weapons of math-destruction” (O’Neil 2016), i.e. automated-decision mak-
ing tools based on algorithms and databases, their features are opacity, scale and 
harm. In terms of opacity, their inner operations and capacities are mostly unknown, 
and their impacts are hardly analysed, but are rather black-boxed. They are rarely 
challenged in practice (see the Slovenian example below). In terms of scale, they 
subject entire populations to their control. And in terms of harm, they often do not 
work properly and deliver false results, e.g. by refusing entrance to those that should 
be allowed to enter.
The EU migration regime contains several dichotomies that undermine the right 
to freedom of movement and the rights to asylum and protection, and put migrants 
at risk of increased surveillance. First, human rights concerns with regard to people 
who have entered the EU are relatively high compared to those left at the outskirts 
of the EU. The social inclusion of migrants and their descendants is closely moni-
tored (see the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA 2017). In re-
sponse to the 2015 asylum emergency, the FRA has been assessing the long-term 
impact on fundamental rights and examining what has happened to those people 
who sought asylum in the EU. The FRA is especially concerned with “vulnerable pop-
ulations”, but these are defined very narrowly, encompassing mainly children, which 
is short-sighted given the stressful situation of all migrants – are not migrants as a 
whole a vulnerable population?
However, there is no real regard for the human rights of those left at the outskirts 
of the EU. The technological solutions are complementary to the EU’s long-standing 
collaboration with countries of origin and transit in the form of migration compacts, 
readmission agreements, and Memoranda of Understanding. These two factors – 
technology and agreements – are both pushing the border into third countries. 
Among the recent agreements is the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 (European Com-
mission 2016), which exemplifies the “external governance” of the EU in an attempt 
to extend its policies into non-member states (Wunderlich 2012), according to 
which an EU Member State (most often Greece) can reject the asylum applications 
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of people who pass through Turkey as being inadmissible and shift the responsibility 
to assess their merits to Turkey. However, it is highly doubtful whether Turkey can 
offer effective protection and be considered a “safe third country”. As the EU has not 
put into place any effective mechanism for monitoring the situation of individuals 
readmitted to Turkey, the EU is, through the provisions of the Statement, preventing 
refugees from accessing asylum procedures and denying them their right to protec-
tion against refoulement (Alpes et al. 2017).
Second, the FRA has extensively analysed the human rights implications of the 
new electronically fortified border regime in the EU (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2018a). However, its reports do not question whether the tech-
nologically enhanced border controls by means of EUROSUR and the employment of 
biometric technologies in the Smart Borders Package are creating a “Digital Fortress 
Europe”. There is an unquestioned reliance on technological fixes with regard to im-
migration. The human rights concerns identified by the FRA (2018a) relate solely to 
the quality of the data in SIS II, VIS and EURODAC informing data subjects about 
data processing, and the lack of adequate safeguards with regard to controlling data 
access. The FRA warns that the data may be hacked and abused, e.g. by oppressive 
regimes, or used unfairly, e.g. infractions committed as juveniles may carry over into 
adulthood. But from a critical perspective, it is doubtful whether these personal data 
protection rights are sufficient. The right to information (e.g. about collected or ac-
cessed data, or the means to correct or delete inaccurate data, etc.) alone cannot 
prevent the “net-widening” effect of one of the largest biometric databases in the 
world. The total surveillance of the Mediterranean and the electronic upgrading of 
border controls bring all ordinary travellers into the focus of border guards. “The EU 
is building a data juggernaut” (Unmüßig, Keller 2012). The plan to make all biometric 
databases interoperable may lead to inconceivable consequences, e.g. concerning 
the security and abuse of data (see critique in European Union Agency for Funda-
mental Rights 2018b).
Moreover, EUROSUR is being promoted as a tool to provide the right to life, i.e. to 
rescue refugees. But the system cannot deliver such a promise. As Hayes & Vermeu-
len (2012) show, maritime rescue services are not even part of EUROSUR, and bor-
der guards do not share information with them. Moreover, there are no procedures 
in place for the treatment or settlement of the “rescued” (Hayes, Vermeulen 2012). 
Technology – in this case EUROSUR – is employed to whitewash the political process 
of the externalisation of the border. Human rights discourse is merely a façade for 
securitisation (Campesi 2014).
Another forthcoming technological solution, the EES, which will collect biomet-
ric data such as fingerprints and face scans from all third-country nationals entering 
the Schengen area, is similarly vague in its objectives. The European Commission’s 
impact assessments do not demonstrate compelling reasons or a pressing need for 
such a large database, and the alleged goal of the EES to increase the detection and 
return of “illegal immigrants” is unfounded (Hayes, Vermeulen 2012).
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Moreover, there is significant reason for scepticism regarding the need for the 
large EU biometric databases arising from the vaguely defined and high costs. An-
dersson argues that the “fight against irregular migration”, rather than curtailing 
movement, has led to more distress and drama at the borders, which in turn has 
fuelled a self-reinforcing industry of controls (Andersson 2014). It appears that the 
only real beneficiaries of these systems are defence contractors. While the European 
Commission estimates the cost of the Smart Borders Package to be on the order of 
€400 million, plus annual operating costs of €190 million, researchers have shown 
that the price may well be on the order of €2 billion (Hayes, Vermeulen 2012). For 
comparison, the cost of upgrading SIS to SIS II was also five times higher than the 
initial estimates.
The Massive EU Biometric Databases in Slovenia
Analysis of the fundamental rights implications of the large EU IT systems in the ar-
eas of borders, visas, and asylum in Slovenia shows another dichotomy: the systems 
operate well; in fact, in 2015, the Slovenian EURODAC controller received an award 
from the Information Commissioner for best practices in personal data protection. 
There is no imminent danger as regards human rights, but these remain hidden. 
The persons affected by EURODAC are vulnerable, with little or no understanding 
of foreign legal system, with no knowledge of the foreign language, and with little 
interest in antagonising the system they seek to become a part of.
Another database, SIS II, is highly targeted, focusing on just those individuals 
involved in criminal law proceedings, police surveillance, or banned from entry into 
EU territory. A study of the legislative, institutional, and practical aspects of SIS II 
shows that it poses no specific human rights issues. However, the targeted populace 
is very unlikely to challenge this IT system. As mentioned above concerning EURO-
DAC, these are either vulnerable populations (e.g. foreigners, missing persons) or 
individuals escaping justice systems (e.g. persons wanted for arrest, extradition, or 
for discreet or specific checks). A study of the fundamental rights implications of 
biometric data stored in large-scale IT systems in the above areas in Slovenia fur-
thermore shows that data subjects have low awareness of the power of these large 
EU IT systems, even though the police and the Information Commissioner offer de-
tailed instructions to individuals regarding the exercise of their rights. Nevertheless, 
there have been no complaints and very little case law regarding the matter. The low 
awareness is even more important if connected to another fact – that the authorities 
rely on the SIS database to a considerable degree. A hit in a database offers powerful 
semiotics as to what the “truth” is in a particular case.
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CONCLUSION
The turn to “the surface”, from narrative to new regimes of truth in the form of bio-
metric databases (Franko Aas 2004) and algorithmic decision-making systems is not 
specific to the “criminology of mobility.” It is rather a part of the increasing reliance 
on the capacity of IT to tackle social problems. Digital technologies, ranging from big 
data analytics and real-time intelligence to algorithmic predictions and pre-emptive 
action, are supposed to solve social problems ranging from crime to migration. This 
is the mythology of technology (Boyd, Crawford 2011) – IT is supposedly more objec-
tive, unbiased, and precise. From such perspective, Frontex, EUROSUR and the large 
EU biometric IT systems in the areas of borders and asylum are part of a global trend 
towards the allure of the technological fixes to all kinds of social problems. Technol-
ogy is conceived as the “ultra-solution” (Bigo, Carrera 2004). Technologies employed 
for tracking migrants, mobile phone applications for migrants, large biometric IT da-
tabases, “lie detectors” at borders (Boffey 2018) etc. are technological fixes that do 
not address the deeply-rooted causes of migration.
This article shows how mobility control technologies intensify surveillance by 
redefining the border. Increasing reliance on the capacity of supposedly objective, 
value-free and apolitical technology is producing a “Digital Fortress Europe”. Digi-
tal walls are being created to complement the physical walls. In terms of the scale, 
opacity and harm of these systems, digital walls re-conceptualise the border in a 
new and often harsher way. Escape from the EU digital wall embodied in the large IT 
databases – EURODAC, SIS II, VIS, and, in addition, the four new IT systems planned, 
i.e. EES, RTF, ETIAS, and ECRIS-TCN,7 and the new framework for their interoperability 
with a Common Identity Repository, is made impossible through the use of biomet-
ric technologies that inscribe a political identity in the body. The currently used and 
planned biometric data comprise fingerprints, palm prints, face scans and DNA pro-
files, with fingerprints predominating in all the above-mentioned databases (except 
ETIAS). However, new “lie-detectors” scrutinising “crimmigrant” bodies are on the 
brink of being employed (Boffey 2018).
Moreover, by “tattooing” borders onto migrant bodies, disciplinary power gives 
way to the post-disciplinary power of “instant surveillance”. The crimmigrant body 
can be checked at anytime and anywhere within the EU. Borders are “tattooed” in 
the body. The border is inscribed into individuals’ retinas, voices, or DNA. The new 
border is mobile and migrates with the unwanted body. The border thus becomes 
portable and digital.
The article shows how digital borders are expensive and mostly ineffective, and 
produce substantial collateral social harm: they reproduce inequality, increase in-
carceration, violate human rights, cause unnecessary deaths, and break up families 
(Jones 2017; Vitale 2017). Due to the numerous extreme forms of harm, borders should 
7 ECRIS-TCN – the European Criminal Records Information System for Third-Country Nationals.
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be de-policed, de-militarised, and, as this article shows, not augmented by means of 
technologies. The decision to employ technology to solve fundamentally non-techno-
logical issues eliminates the possibility of thinking of other solutions. Digital bordering 
is thus part of a larger managerial mentality and approach to tackling social problems. 
The current framing of migration follows the logic of “solutionism” – the view that for 
every social problem there must be a corresponding technological solution (Morozov 
2013). IT is viewed as an infrastructure that will ensure unity in the EU Schengen border 
regime. However, IT fosters the colossal power of both the digital technology industry 
and military contractors, which are the only real beneficiaries of the digital border-
lands. The construction of “Digital Fortress Europe” thus further perpetuates the cycle 
of global inequalities and triggers even more “irregular” migration.
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POVZETEK 
EVROPSKA DIGITALNA TRDNJAVA IN VELIKI BIOMETRIČNI EU IT SISTEMI: 
KRIMINOLOGIJA MEJE, TEHNOLOGIJA IN ČLOVEKOVE PRAVICE
Aleš ZAVRŠNIK
Evropski kriminologi migracijske politike proučujejo od poznih osemdesetih let, ko 
so začeli prepoznavati trend zbliževanje kazenskopravnih ukrepov z upravljanjem 
migracij. Ta raziskovalni interes so imenovali »kriminologija mobilnosti« (Franko Aas, 
Bosworth 2013), »kriminologija meje« (Bosworth, Turnbull 2014), zbliževanje pravnih 
panog pa kot »krimigracijsko pravo« (Hernández 2017). Avtor v prvem delu članka 
prikaže obstoječe raziskave o kriminalizaciji mobilnosti in preoblikovanju kazen-
skopravnih institucij, zaporov in policijskega dela. Nato se osredotoči na digitalno 
področje, kjer z gradnjo velikih zbirk biometričnih podatkov vznikajo novi digitalni 
zidovi. To so SIS II (Šengenski informacijski sistem), VIS (Vizumski informacijski sistem) 
in EURADAC (Evropski sistem za primerjavo prstnih odtisov prosilcev za azil) ter pred-
videni štirje novi sistemi, paket Pametne meje (Sistem vstopa/izstopa in Program za 
registrirane potnike), ETIAS (Evropski sistem za potovalne informacije in odobritve) 
in ECRIS-TCN (Evropski informacijski sistem kazenskih evidenc), hkrati s pripravo in-
teroperabilnosti med omenjenimi podatkovnimi zbirkami. Osrednja teza članka je, 
da s temi zbirkami EU »vpisuje« meje na telo migrantov in ustvarja novo vednost, ki 
disciplinsko oblast spreminja v »hipno oblast«.
Biometrične tehnologije so v uporabi po terorističnih napadih 11. septembra 
2001 v ZDA. Te so uspele izvoziti idejo, da je migracija prvenstveno varnostni pro-
blem, ki ga je mogoče rešiti z vrhunskimi informacijskimi tehnologijami (IT). Evrop-
ska unija se je temu pridružila in gradi »digitalni zid«. Članek pokaže, kako ta odlo-
čitev opušča druge načine reševanja težav, kako je IT »politika z drugimi sredstvi«, 
in to kljub vtisu, da gre za apolitično in objektivno sredstvo, namenjeno »reševanju 
življenj«. V nadaljevanju avtor analizira pojem meje. V nasprotju s konvencionalnim 
prepričanjem prikaže, da se meje »multiplicirajo« in vznikajo na digitalnem področju. 
Pri tem se opre na obstoječe razmisleke Bigoja (2014) in Balibarja (2015). Digitalni zi-
dovi so komplementarni fizičnim mejam, nove meje so »vpisane« neposredno v telo, 
so bolj učinkovite, premikajo se skupaj z »neželenimi« telesi. Takšno »tetoviranje« 
meja na imigrantska telesa kaže na vznik nove postdisciplinske »hipne oblasti«, ki se 
ne opira več na discipliniranje duše. V zadnjem delu članek prikaže škodljivost novih 
digitalnih zidov, kršitve človekovih pravic in večplastnost kaznovanja, ukrojenega 
glede na mesto človeka v »hierarhiji pripadnosti«.
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